17 November 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Editor, Studies in Intelligence

FROM

: David Y. McManis

National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT

Proposed Book Review for Publication in

Studies in Intelligence

1. The attached review of Robert Jervis' 1976 book, Perception and Misperception in International Politics has become particularly timely again as world events such as the Korean Air Lines Flight 7 shootdown demonstrate a vastly different view of the world among nations. It should be highlighted to intelligence analysts.

2. Recommend this review be published in an early issue of Studies in Intelligence.

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Attachment:

As stated (h/w)

A REVIEW OF <u>PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS</u>,

ROBERT JERVIS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

1976, 445pp.

THERE ARE FEW EVENTS IN RECENT HISTORY THAT HAVE
CRYSTALLIZED PUBLIC OPINION AS THE SHOOTDOWN OF KOREAN AIR LINES
FLIGHT 007. THE UNFOLDING OF THOSE EVENTS TOOK A CIRCUITUOUS
PATH OF UNDERSTANDING FOR MANY PEOPLE WHO HAVE SINCE REALIZED,
PERHAPS SOME FOR THE FIRST TIME, THAT THE SOVIETS PERCEIVE THE
WORLD MUCH DIFFERENTLY THAN THE U.S. PERCEIVES THE WORLD.
WHATEVER THE SPECIFIC REASON FOR SHOOTING DOWN A DEFENSELESS
CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT, THE GENERALIZED REASON LIES IN A DIFFERENCE OF
SOCIETIES AND A ZENOPHOBIC PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD EMBEDDED IN A
BUREAUCRACY LADEN WITH RULES TO MEET MOST SITUATIONS. THE
CIRCUMSTANCE POINTS OUT WITH GREAT DEFINITION THAT PERCEPTION IS
AS MUCH A FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS IT IS IN PERSONAL
RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH NOT NEW, THIS VOLUME BY ROBERT JERVIS FILLS
THE BILL AS A WAY TO BEGIN TO UNDERSTAND PERCEPTIONS OF PEOPLE AS
DECISION MAKERS IN AN INTERNATIONAL SENSE.

THIS EXCELLENT BOOK SHOULD BE REQUIRED READING FOR EVERY INTELLIGENCE ANALYST. IT COMBINES A SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, HISTORY, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN A WAY THAT MAKES IT CLEARLY UNDERSTANDABLE WITH SUBJECTS THAT RELATE DIRECTLY TO INTELLIGENCE INTERESTS.

ROBERT JERVIS USES TOPIC SENTENCES, SUMMARIES, AND LISTED CONCLUSIONS TO MAKE HIS POINTS EASY TO UNDERSTAND. EXAMPLES ABOUND THAT ILLUSTRATE IN A STARK WAY THE PROCESS OF HUMAN

PERCEPTION AND HOW THAT HUMANITY IS TRANSFERRED TO RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS.

THIS VOLUME HAS DIRECT IMPACT ON WARNING. IT EXPLAINS FROM MANY PERSPECTIVES WHY INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE CAN PROVIDE A CORRECT ASSESSMENT THAT IS NOT CORRECTLY PERCEIVED BY THE DECISION MAKER. THE PITFALLS OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS INFLUENCED BY PERCEPTIONS ARE ITEMIZED. EVEN THE VISUAL CUES RECEIVED FROM THE MOST GENERALLY ACCEPTED "FACTUAL" SOURCE OF INFORMATION-IMAGERY-TAKE ON A NEW DIMENSION.

THE DISCUSSION PROVIDES FOOD FOR THOUGHT AS ONE ATTEMPTS TO UNDERSTAND PEOPLE OF OTHER NATIONS. PROFESSOR JERVIS MAKES A STRONG CASE FOR UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE DURING THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF EARLY ADULTHOOD TO ANALYZE THE IMPACT ON FUTURE DECISIONS. THIS ARGUES FOR THE SOMEWHAT FORGOTTEN PRACTICE OF THOROUGHLY STUDYING THE BACKGROUND OF LEADERS OF POTENTIAL ADVERSARY NATIONS. INTELLIGENCE BIOGRAPHERS--TAKE HEART.

THE READER IS CONSTANTLY CHALLENGED BY THE LOGIC OF HIS EXAMPLES TO ASK WHETHER A DECISION OR AN ANALYSIS HAS USED ALL THE INFORMATION THAT IS AVAILABLE OR WHETHER ONE SUBCONSCIOUSLY LEFT OUT FACTORS WHICH ARE IMPORTANT BECAUSE THEY ARE PART OF A CENTRAL BODY OF EVIDENCE THAT OPENS NEW THEORIES OR ANALYSES. FOR EXAMPLE, EUROPEAN MILITARY PEOPLE DID THAT WHEN ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAVALRY IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.

"...MANY EUROPEAN OBSERVERS ATTRIBUTED THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF CAVALRY IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR TO THE UNUSUAL TERRAIN AND THE SOLDIERS' LACK

OF TRAINING, NUMBERS, AND LEADERSHIP. IN THIS WAY THE EUROPEANS WERE ABLE TO AVOID RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW FACTOR THAT WOULD APPEAR IN THEIR OWN FUTURE WARS--THE GROWTH OF FIREPOWER."

(p.302)

JERVIS HAS IMPORTANT THINGS TO SAY ABOUT ANALYZING EVIDENCE THAT ARRIVES BIT-BY-BIT AND THE TENDENCY TO FAIL TO LOOK BACK AT TRENDS OR TO PROJECT TO THE FUTURE. ANALYSIS IS IMPACTED MOST BY SUDDEN EVENTS; THEREFORE, THE GRADUALLY DEVELOPING SITUATION LOOMS MORE DANGEROUS BECAUSE WE MAY FAIL TO COMPREHEND ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

STARK, LOGICAL, HISTORICAL EXAMPLES FILL THIS VOLUME. IT IS A PRIMER IN PERCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND SHOULD BE REQUIRED READING FOR ALL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS.

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